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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the L.L.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
This paper examines the article 9 of the Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids which 
refers to the board neutrality. First of all, there is a need to examine the Directive and 
its provisions generally in order to have a complete picture of what regulates. 
Ssubsequently analyzes the principles and rules which govern, including Article 9 on the 
board neutrality.  
The Directive on Takeover Bids regulates the conduction of takeover bids by rules that 
apply to all cross border takeover bids, it gives legal certainty to the Member States and 
the companies generally and  
ensures safety in the course of trade. This safety increases competition and facilitates 
cross border takeover bids.  
With regard to the board neutrality rule detailed in Article 9 of the Directive, this 
protects the bid and more specifically the frustration of the bid. That’s why Bartman1 
believes that the term “non-frustration rule” fits better in Article 9 than the term “board 
neutrality rule”. This rule requires the prior authorization of the general meeting of 
shareholders to the board before action.  
  
Finally, it should be noted that the thesis is made under the supervision of Pr. Thomas 
Papadopoulos, Visiting Professor at the International Hellenic University (Thessaloniki, 
Greece), Lecturer in Commercial Law at the Department of Law of the University of 
Cyprus and with many awards in the field of Takeovers and Mergers.  
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1S Bartman, “Analysis and consequences of the EC Directive on takeover bids” (2004) ECL 5,5  
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Introduction 
The Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 was the result of years of negotiations and 
fruitless attempts. Discussions for a takeover directive begun in the mid-1970s when the 
first proposal was tabled. The different approaches of the Member States (legal and 
policy) contributed to adopt a text that was a compromise of the proposal of the 
European Commission. But by the adoption of this text (directive) the EU tried to offer 
legal certainty and protection to the shareholders with regard to cross-border takeover 
bids. More specifically, the directive contains some obligatory provisions such as the 
sell-out right or the mandatory bid rule and some optional provisions such as the non-
frustration rule or the breakthrough rule. By these provisions the Directive sets out to 
establish minimum guidelines for the conduct of takeover bids involving the securities of 
companies governed by the laws of Member States, where all or some of those securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market; It also seeks to provide an adequate level 
of protection for holders of securities throughout the Community, by establishing a 
framework of common principles and general requirements  which Member States are 
to implement through more detailed rules in accordance with their national systems and 
their cultural contexts2. Moreover, the Directive adopts the reciprocity rule and freedom 
of establishment in order to achieve harmonization, minority investor’ s protection, 
increasing efficiency and legal certainty in the course of trade. Additional objective was 
the protection of the minority shareholders by establishing common rules for all 
Member States which adapted the Member States always in conjunction with their 
national law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2Thomas Papadopoulos, November 2007, academic analysis The mandatory provisions of the EU Takeover 
Bid Directive and their deficiencies, with reference to Europa Website, Activities of the European Union -
Internal Market, SCADPLUS: Takeover Bids, http: // europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126012a.htm,accesed 
21 May 2007. 
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Historical Background  
 
Starting from 1989, Professor Robert Pennington presented a draft Directive for 
takeover bids on request from the European Commission. But the draft he presented 
although protected the shareholders more than any other regulation, was highly 
influenced by the UK Takeover Code. On the other hand, the Commission’s proposal in 
1989 created disappointment to all and especially in Germany. And this because the 
German Takeover Code (adopted by the Borsensachverstaendigenkommision3) 
protected the minority shareholders in Germany and there was no need, in their 
opinion, for a unified takeover system. So, in 1996, the Commission presented a new 
proposal, which included the principle of subsidiarity, because of the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and this proposal was wider and better than the previous one4.  But 
this time, the new proposal created disappointment to the UK Government because 
they found the proposal unlawful and without compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  Amendments were necessary in order to satisfy the 
British concerns with the most important amendment this of article 9. Under this article 
the shareholders have the right to decide upon the bid without the board’s intervention. 
Without the prior shareholder approval the bid could be canceled. The European 
Parliament was not consistent with the prior shareholder approval. The Commission was 
not consistent with the amendment. But Germany ultimately claimed that it was a good 
idea for shareholders to consult. And although Germany supported the common 
Position, from this point onwards change its position and this fact disappointed the rest 
of the Member States. On 5 June 2001, the Council and Parliament, after negotiations 
and conciliation, agreed on a compromise and retain article 9 as had. The only prediction 
added was that Member States could postpone its application for one year after the 
deadline for implementation of the directive5. What remained was the approval of the 
Parliament at first and then the approval of the Council. Unexpectedly, the proposal was 
rejected (273 votes against and the same in favor). The harmonization of takeover bids 
in Europe remained primary objective of the Commission. So a new proposal was 
presented in 2002. The new proposal did not differ with the previous one at the basic 
principles and article 9 maintained unamended but optional (with the right to adopt it if 
an individual company wished to). The reciprocity rule that proposed and the opt in and 
opt out provisions led to the adoption of the proposal in 27 November 2003. The 
European Parliament approved the proposal in 16 December 2003 and Member States 
had to adopt the Directive until 20 May 2006.    
 
 
 
 
3Thomas Papadopoulos , The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC p. 19 with 
reference  n. 34  to C. Kirchner and RW Painter Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed 
Thirteenth EU Directive ad the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for reform 
(2002) 50 An. JComp.L. 451,463. 
4V. Edwards The Directive on Takeover Bids – Not worth the paper it’s written on (2004) 4 ECFR 421. 
5V. Edwards The Directive on Takeover Bids – Not worth the paper it’s written on (2004) 4 ECFR 426. 
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SCOPE OF DIRECTIVE 
The Directive sets out to provide the maximum protection for shareholders and 
generally to establish the basic principles that all Member States follow in the field of 
the internal market and especially in the field of takeover bids. The measures that 
Directive provides such as codes of practice, regulations etc. must be rejected by all 
Member States.  
The general principles that EU Member States must be complied with are: 
 
 Equal treatment : equal treatment must be given to all shareholders 
 Sufficient time and information: sufficient time and information must be given 
to the shareholders in order to make a properly decision on the takeover offer. 
 Board acts in the interests of the company: the board should treat the company 
as a whole and must act only in the interests of the company even if this means 
that the shareholders will decide on the merits of the bid.  
 False markets forbidden: if false markets are created in the securities of an 
offeree company then a rise or fall in their prices leads to artificial and false 
results and this is forbidden.  
 Be sure before announce a bid: an offer in order to announce a bid, must be sure 
that he can fulfill any type of consideration, even cash. 
 Reasonable time for conduct of affairs: the target company must not be affected 
by a bid and must conduct its affairs at a reasonable time. 
 
The Takeover Directive applies to takeover offers, for securities of companies where 
these securities or some of them are admitted to trading on a regulated market (within 
the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC, repealing Directive 93/22/EEC) in one or more EU 
Member States6. 
But the Takeover Directive does not apply to takeover bids for securities issued by 
companies (eg the target company itself) aimed at collective investment of capital and 
does not also apply to public offers for securities issued by the Member State’s central 
banks.  
 
WHAT REGULATES  
In order to understand what the Directive regulates, we must explain what takeover bid 
is. Starting from the term takeover we have to say that a takeover takes place when a 
person wants to become the owner of a company or when a group of persons (natural 
or legal) want to control the management of a company7. 
 
 
 
6European Directive Takeover Guide, Contact Christian Cascante and Jochen Tyrolt, Gleis Lutz, Germany 
 
7MA Weinberg, MV Blank and AL Greystoke Takeovers and Mergers (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1979, 3)
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A takeover may be effected either by an agreement or by a takeover bid. The agreement 
is signed by the person that acquires control of the company and by the holders of the 
majority of the share capital of the company the person acquires. The takeover bid is a 
procedure where the person that acquires control of a company, buys all the shares of 
that company or a voting majority of the shares so the offeree company becomes a 
subsidiary of the other. This means that the acquiring company controls the situation 
and takes decisions because it owns the majority shareholding8.  
Furthermore, a takeover bid constitutes a way for merger. Merger is a procedure where 
two companies of similar size decide to exchange their shares. The difference from the 
takeover is that in merger we have a combined enterprise and the shareholding is spread 
between the shareholders of the two companies. In a takeover, the control of the shares 
is on the hands of the acquirer.  
From all the above, we realize that there was a need for common rules and principles in 
the course of trade and especially rules that apply to all cross border takeover bids in 
order to create legal certainty to the Member States and the necessary safety and this 
is what the Directive regulates.  
 
OBLIGATORY PROVISIONS 
THE MANDATORY BID RULE (Article 5)  
One of the obligatory provisions of the Directive is the mandatory bid rule that article 5 
states.  
According to this article Member States have the possibility to decide when the 
Mandatory Bid Rule applies or not depending on the special circumstances, case by case, 
but always with the precondition that article 3 (1) is respected. Otherwise, equivalent 
protection that must be provided for the protection of the minority shareholders. The 
main problem with article 5 is exactly this, that it gives discretion to the Member States 
so there are derogations from the safeguards of the Directive. More specifically, article 
5 (4) states: 
Provided that the general principles laid down in Article 3 (1) are respected, Member 
States may provide in the rules that they make or introduce pursuant to this Directive for 
derogations from those rules: (1) by including such derogations in their national rules, in 
order to take account of circumstances determined at national level and/or (2) by 
granting their supervisory authorities, where they are competent, powers to waive such 
national rules, to take account of the circumstances referred to in (1) or in other specific 
circumstances, in which case a reasoned decision must be requires.  
Although the derogation provision has been justified for flexibility reasons (from the 
Commission), nevertheless, constitutes an issue that saw considerable debate. Mainly, 
because the directive does not particularize the voting rights that must have somebody 
to control the company or the share of capital needed. Generally, the article 5 is not fully 
comprehensive. 
 
8LS Sealy The Draft Thirteenth Directive on Take-overs in S Kenyon – Slade and M Andenas (eds), EC 
Financial Market Regulation and Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1973), 135.   
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THE SQUEEZE-OUT RIGHT (Article 15) 
According to article 15 (2) of the Directive Member States shall ensure that an offeror is 
able to require all the holders of the remaining securities to sell him/her those securities 
at a fair price. This article reflects the squeeze-out right with additional target the 
protection of investors and the promotion of freedom of establishment. 
 
 
 THE SELL-OUT RIGHT (Article 16) 
 
Here the holder of remaining shares is entitled to require the bidder to buy these 
securities at a fair price. The aim of this provision is to protect the shareholders (the 
remaining shareholders) by offering a way of exit to them9.  
OPTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE 
THE BREAKTHROUGH RULE (Article 11)  
The breakthrough rule is a rule that aims at the promotion of takeover bids and their 
facilitation and does not allow the any obstruction of takeover activity. Moreover, it 
requires the exercise of rights in order to achieve freedom of shareholders. The meaning 
of the rule is that the shareholders which have large proportion of shares in a company 
should have a dominant role in the control of that company.  
 
THE RECIPROCITY RULE (Article 12) 
According to Article 12 par. 3 Member States may, under the conditions determined by 
national law, exempt companies which apply Article 9 (2) and (3) and/or Article 11 from 
applying Article 9 (2) and (3) and/or Article 11 if they become the subject of an offer 
launched by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do or by a 
company controlled, directly or indirectly, by the latter, pursuant to Article 1 of Directive 
83/349/EEC.  
This is a rule that is common in European law and also found in other European 
Directives.  But the Takeover Bid Directive does not indicate clearly the context in which 
the rule of the reciprocity is applied. This implies many times to apply the companies 
different provisions to reciprocate and the situation becomes complicated.  
 
 
 
 
 
9J Grant Takeover Regulation and the Balancing of Interests and E Bonans and C Demoulin Acting in 
Concert – first conclusions drawn from two recent Takeovers and the Takeover Directive in J Grant (ed), 
European Takeovers: the Art of Acquisition (1st 6dn Euromoney Books, London 2005), 50.     
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This complicated situation leads in turn to problems concerning the interpretation, the 
practical effect of the reciprocity rule and the issue if partial implementation of the two 
key provisions is allowed.  
THE NON-FRUSTATION RULE (Article 9)  
Article 9 
Obligations of the board of the offeree company 
1.   Member States shall ensure that the rules laid down in paragraphs 2 to 5 are 
complied with. 
2.   During the period referred to in the second subparagraph, the board of the offeree 
company shall obtain the prior authorization of the general meeting of 
shareholders given for this purpose before taking any action, other than seeking 
alternative bids, which may result in the frustration of the bid and in particular 
before issuing any shares which may result in a lasting impediment to the 
offeror’s acquiring control of the offeree company. 
Such authorization shall be mandatory at least from the time the board of the offeree 
company receives the information referred to in the first sentence of Article 6(1) 
concerning the bid and until the result of the bid is made public or the bid 
lapses. Member States may require that such authorization be obtained at an 
earlier stage, for example as soon as the board of the offeree company becomes 
aware that the bid is imminent. 
3.   As regards decisions taken before the beginning of the period referred to in the 
second subparagraph of paragraph 2 and not yet partly or fully implemented, 
the general meeting of shareholders shall approve or confirm any decision 
which does not form part of the normal course of the company’s business and 
the implementation of which may result in the frustration of the bid. 
4.   For the purpose of obtaining the prior authorization, approval or confirmation of 
the holders of securities referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, Member States may 
adopt rules allowing a general meeting of shareholders to be called at short 
notice, provided that the meeting does not take place within two weeks of 
notification’s being given. 
5.   The board of the offeree company shall draw up and make public a document 
setting out its opinion of the bid and the reasons on which it is based, including 
its views on the effects of implementation of the bid on all the company’s 
interests and specifically employment, and on the offeror’s strategic plans for 
the offeree company and their likely repercussions on employment and the 
locations of the company’s places of business as set out in the offer document in 
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accordance with Article 6(3)(i). The board of the offeree company shall at the 
same time communicate that opinion to the representatives of its employees or, 
where there are no such representatives, to the employees themselves. Where 
the board of the offeree company receives in good time a separate opinion from 
the representatives of its employees on the effects of the bid on employment, 
that opinion shall be appended to the document. 
6.   For the purposes of paragraph 2, where a company has a two-tier board structure 
‘board’ shall mean both the management board and the supervisory board. 
 
According to article 9 of the Directive the prior authorization of the general meeting of 
shareholders is necessary before any decision taken from the target’ s board. This 
authorization may lead to the frustration of the bid, but since the aim is to protect the 
interests of shareholders, the only thing that the board can do is to search for alternative 
bids so the shareholders can choose the most appropriate for the company. It is 
important to refer that it is up to the shareholders to decide on defensive measures, if 
necessary10.  
The board on the other hand, can express its opinion for the bid by a document, which 
analyzes the board’s opinion, the justification of its opinion etc. (Article 9 paragraph 5 
of the Directive).  
It is often mentioned, in association with the non-frustration rule, the term white 
knights. As I mentioned above, during the bid period the board can search for alternative 
bids so the shareholders can choose the most appropriate for company. The potential 
alternative bidder is called white knight. And this procedure consists an exception from 
the non-frustration rule and regards non-coercive alternative bids. There are however 
the coercive bids which are the result of a high pressure brought to shareholders to 
accept a bid that it is not so attractive than another bid offered. This pressure derives 
from the fact that there is no coordination between the shareholders about the 
decisions taken and shareholders do accept the bid fearing that if they do not accept the 
bid they will stay with underpriced shares. The mandatory bid rule protects the 
shareholders from this pressure to accept a bid that is not attractive.   
As the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission’s 2002 proposal says:  
Where control of the offeree company is at stake, it is important to ensure that its fate 
is decided by its shareholders. The authorization of the general meeting must therefore 
be given explicitly with a view to responding to a specific bid.  
Moreover, the aim of the legal basis of Article 50 (2) g TFEU must be fulfilled.  
There is an issue about those shares that was decided upon before the launch of the bid. 
Paragraph 3 of article 9 applies and the general meeting of shareholders must approve 
actions that do not form part of the normal course of the company’s business. The 
interpretation of the article above states that the new shares during the bid period 
consist a defensive measure.  
 
 
 
10R. Skog The takeover Directive - an endless Saga (2002) 13, EBLR, 307    
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There is also an issue about the partial bids and the two-tier bids.  
 Partial bids: the shareholders hold the average value of the price offered and 
their aim is to tender. 
 Two-tier bids: there is a front-end offer at a high price and there is a promise for  
a second back-end offer for the rest shares at a lower price. What is important is the 
difference between the front-end and the back-end price because the greater is the 
potential loss for non-tendering shareholders the more shareholders are forced to 
tender11. 
 
In more detail, objective of the directive with the introduction of Article 9 is to protect 
those companies holding titles, the harmonization, and transparency and 
simultaneously to protect the interests of third parties12.  
Quite useful for the interpretation of the Directive were the findings of the Winter 
Committee on which was based the proposal of 2002. The assumptions of the Winter 
report were many. Firstly, the success of a share offer depends on factors which 
distinguish in general economic factors and corporate factors. The first category, the 
general economic factors can be self-financing, long term loans etc. The second 
category, the corporate factors can be non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, 
administration rights etc. shaping each one either the pre-bid structure either the post-
bid structure13. The problem that the Winter report faced was that Member States had 
adopted different factors (general or corporate) so the share offers had different 
approach at each Member State (lack of a level playing field). Moreover, the Winter 
report remarked that the share offers are not always beneficial for the companies or the 
shareholders. That’s why it stressed how important was the harmonization based on the 
principle of shareholder decision-making and the principle of proportionality between 
risk bearing and control. Article 9 of the Directive serve this purpose, the harmonization. 
First it introduces the principle of neutrality of the board (of course with exceptions). 
Obligation of the board of the offeree company is to have previously received 
authorization from the general meeting of shareholders to do so.  
The relevant period during which it should be authorized begins when the board of 
directors receives information about the offer.  
What is also important is to respect the shareholder’s pre-emption rights because 
intention of the board is the non-exercise of the pre-emption rights of the minority 
shareholders as this leads to capital increase and watering down control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11Federico M. Mucciarelli, Bologna 15th June 2006 White knights and black knights, working paper, p. 6     
  12C. Kirchner, AG 1999, 485     
  13 Adrianesis Anastasios, Τhe position of the Management Board in public limited company shares market 
proposals, p. 91-92 
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Interaction of article 9 with article 12  
 
Article 12 states that:  
 
Optional arrangements 
1.   Member States may reserve the right not to require companies as referred to in 
Article 1(1) which have their registered offices within their territories to apply Article 9(2) 
and (3) and/or Article 11. 
2.   Where Member States make use of the option provided for in paragraph 1, they shall 
nevertheless grant companies which have their registered offices within their territories 
the option, which shall be reversible, of applying Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11, 
without prejudice to Article 11(7). 
The decision of the company shall be taken by the general meeting of shareholders, in 
accordance with the law of the Member State in which the company has its registered 
office in accordance with the rules applicable to amendment of the articles of 
association. The decision shall be communicated to the supervisory authority of the 
Member State in which the company has its registered office and to all the supervisory 
authorities of Member States in which its securities are admitted to trading on regulated 
markets or where such admission has been requested. 
3.   Member States may, under the conditions determined by national law, exempt 
companies which apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11 from applying Article 9(2) 
and (3) and/or Article 11 if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company 
which does not apply the same Articles as they do, or by a company controlled, directly 
or indirectly, by the latter, pursuant to Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC. 
4.   Member States shall ensure that the provisions applicable to the respective 
companies are disclosed without delay. 
5.   Any measure applied in accordance with paragraph 3 shall be subject to the 
authorization of the general meeting of shareholders of the offeree company, which 
must be granted no earlier than 18 months before the bid was made public in accordance 
with Article 6(1). 
 
As we see, article 12 states that the implementation of article 9 is optional. With this 
setting, the non-frustration rule loses its value. This is an unparalleled setting for the 
data of the European Community14.  And undermines any attempt for harmonization 
since the application of article 9 par. 2 and article 9 par. 3 is left to the discretion of the 
Member States15. Here is clearly seen that the Directive is a compromise of competing 
interests (legislative and political interests). But if they didn’t accept Article 12 with the 
optional application of article 9, the Directive would not exist (after many trials). On the 
other hand, if they had adopted the 2001 proposal the non-frustration rule would be 
obligatory and non-optional.  
 
 
 
14D. Avgitidi, DEE 2006,268, B. Clarke, JBL 2006, 372   
15D. Tuchinsky, NYL Sch. L. Rev. 2006-2007, 708 
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Defensive measures of the board 
 
Defensive measures are those measures that are taken by the board to frustrate a bid16. 
It is a very broad meaning and practically can be any behavior that leads to the 
frustration of the bid. They may be predicted before the appearance of the public 
proposal (preventive measures17). This helps in advance the protection of the 
company18. Or after it (post-bid defenses) such as white knight, share buy-backs and 
special dividends, Pacman defenses, strategic acquisitions, poison pills, anti-trust 
litigation etc.  
More specifically, the defensive measures are distinguished on the basis of their results. 
For example, there are those defensive measures that impede the exercise of control of 
the board such as the staggered boards. Or those that impede the exercise of control of 
the general assembly such as golden shares and voting caps. Also, those that impede 
the acquisition of shares of the company such as ownership caps. Those that impede the 
exercise of control in the company’s assets e.g. scorched earth or crown jewels.  
The individual defensive measures of the board   
- Capital increase – issuance of convertible bonds 
The procedure of capital increase and issuance of convertible bonds, lead to the increase 
of the cost of acquisition. This means that, the offeror, in order to control the company, 
must buy more shares. May even this measure be accompanied by exclusion of the right 
of existing shareholders. 
 
- Litigation 
 
The frustration of the bid is possible with the entry of a litigation. This is because the 
above procedure births procedural costs and delays even when it comes to application 
unfounded. The basis of the action may relate to the infringement of competition rules 
or the contamination of the environment. It is not necessary to affect public proposal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
16M. Tsibris, The public proposal, p. 240 
17I. Anastasopoulou, Tribute to Andreas Loukopoulos, p. 226 
18A. Gardner, ICCLR 1992, 94 
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- Substantial change in the assets and liabilities (kamikaze strategy)  
Changes in the assets and liabilities of a company cause repulsion of the offeror because 
they reduce the productive capacity of the company and therefore its value. In these 
cases the board may sell its fixed assets (scorched earth policy) or to sell a part of the 
company (crown jewel defense) 19 or even to make leverage recapitalization. Even worse 
to commit corporate suicide such as the board of St. Joe Minerals company suggested 
when Seagram initiated a tender offer.  
- Commitment of business policy  
With the commitment of its business policy the company signs long term contracts 
e.g. with its suppliers or by a franchising. Thus the company loses the opportunity to 
meander. There is an issue about the so called embedded defenses. Basically they are 
clauses contained in contracts and they may lead to the frustration of the bid.  
- Announcements  
 
The board of a company may announce the public offer in order either to lure the 
shareholders to accept the offer either to lure the shareholders to refuse the offer. Great 
attention is needed to this procedure in order not to commit the offense of market 
manipulation.  
- Defensive investment decisions 
Defensive investment decisions are:  
a) The acquisition of own shares e.g. stock buybacks 
b) Circular shareholdings 
c) Pacman defense (for capital companies only) 
d) Antitrust defense 
19N. Krause, Comp. Law 2002, 323 
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- Contractual agreements for shares 
Usually, is agreed that the counterparty shareholder before selling the shares to a third 
person must offer his/her shares to the company and the shareholders under the same 
conditions and price and if nobody is interested then he/she can sell to a third person 
(preemption pact).  
The application of the rule of neutrality in Greece  
Since the Member States had to transpose the Directive 2004/25/EC into their national 
law, Greece adopted 3461/2006 law. Article 14 of 3461/2006 law refers to the 
obligations of the board of the offeree company, following article 9 of the Directive 
2004/25/EC but with the difference that in the Greek Law (3461/2006) there is no use 
of discretion under Article 12 of the Directive for optional application of the neutrality 
rule. More specifically article 14 states that the Board cannot take any actions outside 
the ordinary course of the Company and are likely to result in the frustration of the 
proposal. And when we talk about any actions we mean any  
legal or physical operation. But it must be an unusual management operation which 
tenders result to the frustration of the bid.  
With the conditions laid down by Greek law, the regulatory scope of the rule of 
neutrality shrinks. And this happens because the Directive does not include this 
limitation (for actions outside the ordinary course of the company). We only meet a 
similar limitation in the Directive at Article 9 par. 4 which refers to those decisions of the 
board dating before the entry into force of the rule of neutrality29.   
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN CYPRUS  
Cyprus adopted the Takeover Directive by Law 41 (I)/ 2007. From the two main 
provisions of the Takeover Directive (this of article 9 board neutrality rule, and this of 
article 12 the breakthrough rule) Cyprus decided to adopt the first one of board 
neutrality as obligatory and the second one of breakthrough rule as optional. 
 More specifically, Article 34 of Law 41 (I)/ 2007 states that the board of the offeree 
company cannot take any action which may result to the frustration of the bid without 
prior authorization of the general meeting of shareholders (of course with exceptions). 
Moreover, decisions that does not form part of the normal course of the company must 
  -12- 
be approved by the general meeting of shareholders if they are taken by the board 
before the beginning of this period.  
The adoption of the board neutrality rule (and even as mandatory) contributes to the 
strengthening of freedom of establishment such as Article 49 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states:      
 RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Article 49 
(ex Article 43 TEC) 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State 
shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the 
territory of any Member State. 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-
employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or 
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is 
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital. 
And to gain control of a company by Takeover Bid is an exercise of the right of freedom 
of establishment. Case C – 251/98 C. Baars {2000} ECR I-02787 refers to exactly this 
conclusion:  
The Court (5th Chamber) answer on the questions submitted by provision 8 July 1998 
Gerechtschof te ‘s-Grevenhage, hereby rules:  
The article 52 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, article 43 EC) prohibits tax 
legislation of Member States such as the question in lady trial, who, in case the 
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participation to the capital of a company provides in shares/shares holder to has 
undeniable influence in the company’s decisions and to determine its activities, 
- Allows resident domestic nationals of Member States overall or partial exemption 
from wealth tax in respect of assets invested in shares/corporate shares of the 
company,  
- But makes that exception subject to the condition it participation in a company 
established in that Member State, so refuses that exception to shares/shares of 
companies holders established in other Member States.  
Aim of Cyprus legislation was to strengthen the internal market and the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment.  
On the other hand, Cyprus decided to adopt the breakthrough rule as an optional one.  
Article 35 of Law 41 (I)/ 2007 states that the general meeting of shareholders may 
choose to adopt the breakthrough rule. This optional character of the breakthrough rule 
does creates some problems to takeover activity. First of all, it does not facilitate the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment. Secondly, it does not attract foreign potential 
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bidders and generally it does not help to strengthen takeover bids, it constitutes 
protectionist provision.  
The application of board neutrality rule in other jurisdictions 
According to par. 7 of the 2012 Commission’s Report on the application of the Directive 
2004/25/EC on takeover bids word is the following:  
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Spain 
and the United Kingdom have transposed the board neutrality rule.  
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have transposed the breakthrough rule.  
In accordance with article 12 (3) of the Directive, about half of the Member States 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) allow companies who are subject to 
the board neutrality rule and/or breakthrough rule (by law or based on the articles of 
association of the company) not to apply the rule when they are confronted with a 
takeover bid by an offeror who is not subject to the same rule (reciprocity)20.  
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN FRANCE 
In France, the implementation of the Takeover Directive generally, started with the 
Lepetit Report21 in 2005 which was an advisory study by the government suggesting how 
to implement the Directive. The Report accepted the board neutrality rule and the 
reciprocity rule but rejected the breakthrough rule because, as it explains, causes 
limitation to the freedom of establishment. In contrast, proposed the application of the 
breakthrough rule in conjunction with cancellation of voting caps after a successful bid. 
20Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and 
social committee and the committee of the regions, Brussels 28.06.2012 
21Jean-Francois Lepetit, Rapport Du Groupe De Travail Sur La Transposition De La Directive Concernant 
Les Offres Publiques D’ Acquisition (2005) France                                                                                                 .                   
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Finally France voted the French Code de Commerce in order to implement the Takeover 
Directive, concluding the board neutrality rule but subject to reciprocity rule.  
This means that the impact of the reciprocity rule is such that that shareholders are 
always involved in decisions about defensive measures. In France we also meet the BSAs 
(bons de souscription d’ actions) which are warrants for the subscription of shares issued 
upon the general meeting. BSA’ s remind us the poison pills of United States. Indeed 
they are similar as both can be used for negotiation with the bidder but differentiated 
at the procedure they follow because BSA’s are issued only with the shareholder’s 
authorization.   
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN GERMANY 
Germany also adopted the Takeover Directive in July 2006 (WpUG) but opted out of 
both board neutrality rule and the breakthrough rule22. As Guidi Ferrarini and Geoffrey 
P.Miller say23 the German government, which had supported the first drafts of the 
European Takeover Directive, switched positions and opposed the final ones after 
Mannesmann’s takeover24. The rejection of board neutrality rule in German Law was a 
result of politic and economic features.  
 
 
 
 
22Thomas Schurrle Et Al, The European Takeover Directive: Status Of Implementation 6 (2006) available 
at http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/ac 744779-09e1-448c-aa35-
003adb117040/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b18d9b78-ab24-4a08-ab8c-
0756baffa25c1/EuropeanTakeoverDirective.pdf.  
23Guido Gerrarini, Geoffrey P.Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation In the United States and 
Europe, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.42, Issue 3 Fall 2009, Article 1. 
24Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal 
Systems 80 (2008) 
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THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN ITALY 
In Italy the Takeover Directive was implemented gradually. Firstly, under the Prodi 
government the breakthrough rule and the neutrality rule were mandatory for the 
companies. Subsequently, the Berlusconi Government introduced the optional 
character of the above rules and the companies could choose to opt in into their effect 
in order to apply the. Today, under the Berlusconi Government (1st of July 2010) the 
board neutrality rule consists a default rule25 but companies can choose to exclude it if 
they wish.  
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN SPAIN  
The Spain Law which adopted the Takeover Directive is Law No. 6 of April 12, 2007. 
Under this law the board neutrality rule is subject to reciprocity rule and the 
breakthrough rule is opted out. Pre-bid defenses and voting caps are permitted under 
Spanish Law and are used by the companies. The fact that the breakthrough rule is opted 
out does not affect the takeovers.  
25Decree-Law No. 146, art. 1 (3), Sept. 25, 2009, Gazz. Uff. No. 246, Oct. 10,2009  
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NEUTRALLITY IN UNITED KINGDOM 
The City Code of United Kingdom includes takeovers. There was an issue if the Takeover 
Directive could be implemented by a City Code. Well, since the Directive states that has 
to be transposed in the Member States through laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions, the City Code is permitted26. Under the City Code the board neutrality rule 
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was provided for in Article 21 but no reciprocity was allowed and the breakthrough rule 
was not adopted.  
26Brian E. Rosenzweig, Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of British and American 
Takeover Controls, 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int’ L 213, 227 (2007) 
Comparison of the choice of neutrality by the EU Directive with the American approach 
on this matter 
There is a distinction between the European approach and the U.S. approach to 
takeovers. Although at first sight we meet many similarities between the two 
approaches such as the equal treatment of the shareholders, the quick announcement 
of the bids by the bidders, the appropriate disclosures, the offer of the highest bid price 
and the reveal of information to the shareholders in order to make the appropriate 
decisions for the company, however the differences are many and substantive. The 
Directive puts certain conditions on which America breaches. As Susie Choi says in the 
US the function of protecting minority shareholders against majority oppression is 
principally vested in state corporate law27.  Under the U.S. Law the board has the choice 
to decide about a bid and to refuse an unwanted takeover and poison pills are often 
used to deter takeovers. Indeed, this procedure has been approved by Delaware Courts 
(Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. 16A 3d 48, 129 Del. Ch. 2011)28. Also, under the 
U.S. Law the board can use its defensive measures while the Directive tries to give the 
competence of decision making only to the shareholders. Generally, the U.S. Law does 
not regulate the takeovers, does not protect the shareholders and it is to the discretion 
of the board to decide about them or to Delaware Judges.  
27,28Susie Choi, An Evaluation of the EU Takeover Directive (Thirteenth Directive) Through the Lens of the 
Harmonization Process, European Union Law Working Papers, No. 12, Stanford – Vienna, footnote 99 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION  
According to this principle the target companies have the obligation to reveal any 
information that could lead to the frustration of the bid. That’s why is one of the most 
important principles that the Directive sets in force. More specifically, the obligation to 
reveal any information is important for the shareholders in order to take a decision 
about the bid.  It is met in article 10 of the Directive and refers to the obligation of the 
target companies to reveal whatever could influence the bid. It is also met in article 6 of 
the Directive and refers to the obligation of the bidder to reveal any information 
concerning to the bid. This obligation to provide information achieve transparency and 
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protection of shareholders. The companies usually reveal their structures meaning their 
defensive measures. And this happens by a report (an explanatory report) which is 
presented every year to the general meeting of shareholders as article 10 par. 3 of the 
Directive states.  
Article 10 par. 1 of the Directive obliges the disclosure of information of the rights and   
of shares and the percentage of total share capital (a), of any restrictions of the transfer 
of securities (b), of significant direct and indirect shareholdings(c), of the special control 
rights (d), of the system of control of any employee share scheme (where the control 
rights are not exercised directly by the employees) (e), of any restrictions on voting 
rights (f), of any agreements between shareholders which are known to the company 
(g), of the rules governing the appointment and replacement of board members and the 
amendment of the articles of association (h), of the powers of board members (i), of any 
significant agreements to which the company is a party and which take effect, alter or 
terminate upon a change of control of the company following a takeover bid (j) and of 
any agreements between the company and its board members or employees providing 
for compensation if they resign or are made redundant without valid reason or if their 
employment ceases because of a takeover bid (k). If all this information is disclosed the 
potential bidder will be more careful before launching a bid.  
 Article 6 on the other hand, refers to the obligation of information from the perspective 
of the bidder. Here, the disclosure of information is made by an offer document which 
must be approved in advance by the supervisory authority and must contain what par. 
3 of article 6 of the Directive states i.e. (a) the terms of the bid, (b) the identity of the 
offeror and, where the offeror is a company, the type, name and registered office of 
that company, (c) the securities or, where appropriate, the class or classes of securities 
for which the bid is made, (d) the consideration offered for each security or class of 
securities and, in the case of a mandatory bid, the method employed in determining it, 
with particulars of the way in which that consideration is to be paid, (e) the 
compensation offered for the rights which might be removed as a result of the 
breakthrough rule laid down in Article 11(4), with particulars of the way in which that 
compensation is to be paid and the method employed in determining it, (f) the 
maximum and minimum percentages or quantities of securities which the offeror 
undertakes to acquire, (g) details of any existing holdings of the offeror, and of persons 
acting in concert with him/her, in the offeree company, (h) all the conditions to which 
the bid is subject, (i) the offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the 
offeree company and, in so far as it is affected by the bid, the offeror company and with 
regard to the safeguarding of the jobs of their employees and management, including 
any material change in the conditions of employment, and in particular the offeror’s 
strategic plans for the two companies and the likely repercussions on employment and 
the locations of the companies' places of business, (j) the time allowed for acceptance 
of the bid, (k) where the consideration offered by the offeror includes securities of any 
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kind, information concerning those securities, (l) information concerning the financing 
for the bid, (m) the identity of persons acting in concert with the offeror or with the 
offeree company and, in the case of companies, their types, names, registered offices 
and relationships with the offeror and, where possible, with the offeree company, (n) 
the national law which will govern contracts concluded between the offeror and the 
holders of the offeree company’s securities as a result of the bid and the competent 
courts.  
All the above information is crucial for the bidder and contributes to the protection of 
shareholders of the target company, to the protection of shareholders of the offeror, to 
legal certainty and to transparency.    
 
Conclusion 
As I mentioned above, aim of the Directive 2004/25/EC was to achieve harmonization, 
minority investor’ s protection, increasing efficiency and legal certainty in the course of 
trade. Additional objective was the protection of the minority shareholders by 
establishing common rules for all Member States which adapted the Member States 
always in conjunction with their national law. Unfortunately, all the principles that the 
Directive adopts do not contribute to this aim. Conversely, instead of harmonization 
create multiformity. Although they tried many years for a common legal text and 
although the negotiations were many they finally voted a legal text that is characterized 
as a compromise.   
Former Commissioner Bolkenstein said that the Takeover Bid Directive is not worth the 
paper that it is written on30. This means that frustrations were to arrive ultimately at a 
text which was a compromise. The disadvantages of the Directive are many. The non-
frustration rule and the reciprocity rule in conjunction with the optional character of 
their application present disadvantages. The deficiencies in the text of the Directive are 
many and are substantive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
29F. Eastbook/ D. Fishel, Harv. L. Rev. 1981,1201 
 
30Thomas Papadopoulos, The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/EC, 2008 
with reference n. 308 Bulletin Quotidien Europe 26 November 2003   
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With the most important that some defensive measures fall outside the scope of the 
Directive. The public share purchase proposals is a modern creature market practice 
especially useful for controlling a company or for the cooperation of companies. But 
because there are interests that are served there are also and conflicts. And these 
conflicts create concern to the Board and its behavior.  
The legislator must not forget that the aim of the Directive is the protection of 
shareholders, the harmonization and the creation of a unified market in corporate 
control (on EU level).
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